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Introduction 
According to the Australian Energy Market Commission (AEMC), the objectives of 
energy retail market competition are to give customers the opportunity to choose among 
competing retailers and to deliver efficient prices and services.1 In neoclassical 
economic theory, effective competition is desirable because it allocates resources 
efficiently and maintains pressure on market participants to deliver efficient prices to 
consumers. The Victorian retail energy market is designed to work competitively with the 
informed choices of consumers placing competitive constraints on price and restricting 
inefficient market outcomes. Unlike other Australian retail energy markets, Victorian 
retail prices are not subject to a regulated price cap.  
Once a competitive retail market is in place, it may or may not deliver on these 
expectations. Hence, it is important to 
assess the impact of reforms to ensure 
they are delivering the intended 
public benefits. Deregulated markets 
The Victorian retail electricity 
and gas markets 
The electricity market 
According to the latest available data 
from the Essential Services 
Commission (ESC)3, for the year 2011
-12 there were 12 electricity retailers 
of significance operating in Victoria. 
Two of these retailers are owned by 
the same parent company. These 12 
retailers supplied a total of 
2,641,832 customers of which 
2,331,288 were households and 
330,545 were businesses.  
The gas market 
Over the same 2011-12 period there 
were 7 retailers of natural gas. These 
retailers supplied a total of 
1,869,073 customers of which 
1,817,030 were households and 
52,043 were businesses.  
do not necessarily become effectively 
competitive, and the presence of 
market failures can result in 
inefficient outcomes that may justify 
targeted interventions. 
The Consumer Utilities Advocacy 
Centre Ltd. (CUAC) has had some 
concerns about the level of 
competition in the Victorian retail 
ene rgy  marke t  s ince  p r ice 
deregulation. Despite high rates of 
switching between providers in 
Victoria, the market remains 
concentrated and innovation is 
limited. Customer service standards 
are in decline and our research has 
shown significant problems with the 
information available to consumers. 
Given this, CUAC has committed to 
  
 
 
 
 
 
research and monitor issues in the Victorian retail market to continually assess 
competition effectiveness. As part of this effort, we recently completed research into 
consumer participation in the Victorian retail energy market, which found that many 
consumers find it difficult to participate effectively.2  
This short paper builds on that work by looking at the issue of market concentration in 
the retail market, how it is trending and what this might mean for the effectiveness of 
competition. Two widely used measures of market concentration, the Herfindahl–
Hirschman Index (HHI) and the Four Firm Concentration Ratio (CR4) will be applied to 
the Victorian retail electricity and gas markets for each year since price deregulation. 
From this, we are able to explore whether market concentration is an issue for continued 
monitoring and, along with other evidence from the market, identify further areas for 
examination as well as possible policy and regulatory implications.  
Market concentration—How is it measured? What does it tell us?  
Although it does not provide a complete picture of market dynamics or competitiveness, 
measures of market concentration can offer some useful information about the health of 
competition within a particular market. When data on concentration is coupled with 
other information such as the height of barriers to entry, the level of innovation, the 
ability of market participants to set prices above marginal costs and the homogeneity of 
the market’s products, it gives an understanding of the effectiveness of competition. 
According to analysis in the AEMC’s First Final Report on the Review of the effectiveness 
of competition in electricity and gas retail markets in Victoria, concentration indices are 
a relevant factor “when analysing the extent and nature of competition in a market or 
likely changes to competition in a market as a consequence of mergers or firm conduct. 
They are relevant because the unilateral market power of individual firms and the 
collective or coordinated market power of a group of firms tends to increase with their 
market share.”1 
In a relatively new market, such as the competitive retail electricity and gas markets, the 
analysis of market concentration can highlight the effectiveness of new entrants in 
challenging the position of incumbent businesses and improving the effectiveness of 
 2 
Key points 
 Market concentration as measured by HHI and CR4 are relevant to the 
analysis of competition in a market and the extent of market power. 
 Measures of concentration are not definitive indicators of competitiveness 
and need to be considered alongside other data.  
 HHI and CR4 are the most common measures of market concentration. HHI 
is the sum of the squares of the market shares of all the firms in the market 
and CR4 is the sum of the market shares of the largest four firms in a 
market.  
  
 
 
  
 
 
competition. The ACCC, in its merger guidelines, emphasises that changes in market 
concentration over time can “reveal the frequency of new entry and provide insight into 
the ability of new entrants and smaller competitors to attract custom and expand.”4 
Broadly speaking, the conventional view is that industry concentration is associated with 
incumbent monopoly power.5 If market concentration is high and remains that way,  
incumbent firms may be exercising their market power to restrict new entrants and 
competition while maintaining their dominant position. Where market concentration is 
declining over time, this highlights the effectiveness of new entrants at challenging the 
dominant market participants. The importance of analysing concentration changes over 
time is also emphasised by the AEMC.1  
Having said this, measures of concentration are by no means definitive measures of 
competitive market health. They are illustrative of some of the market dynamics but they 
are not an analysis of the strategic behaviour of market participants. Measures of 
concentration are most often used by regulators as an initial test of competition when 
assessing mergers and acquisitions. The concentration assessment is then supplemented 
with other information to determine the likely effects on competition of any merger.  
Given this, it is important to evaluate competition and market dynamics with regard to a 
broad range of data and evidence. Concentration is just one limited tool in the 
information available to assess market competitiveness. This paper seeks to highlight 
concentration trends in the Victorian retail electricity and gas markets and to place this 
in the context of current and future work into the competitiveness of those markets.  
HHI and CR4  
There are two frequently used measures of market concentration. These are the 
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) and the four firm concentration ratio (CR4). The HHI 
has received widespread attention because of its use by competition regulators in 
assessing whether to allow mergers and acquisitions within particular markets. The 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) will usually begin its 
analysis of a potential merger by analysing the HHI. The HHI is calculated by adding 
the sum of the squares of the market shares of the firms in a particular market. The HHI 
can range from 0 to 10,000, where 0 would indicate very low concentration and 
10,000 would indicate the presence of a complete monopoly. According to the 
guidelines, the ACCC is less likely to be concerned with mergers in a particular market 
where the post merger HHI is less than 2,000, or if the post merger HHI has not 
increased from the pre merger HHI by more than 100. This suggests that the ACCC 
starts to become concerned about market concentration levels in excess of 2,000 as 
measured by HHI.4 The HHI is generally the preferred measure of market concentration 
because it gives greater weight to the market share of larger firms in measuring the level 
of concentration.  
Conversely, the CR4 does not give greater weight to large firms as it is simply a sum of 
the market shares of the four largest firms in a particular market. This means that a 
substantial change in the market share of one of the dominant four firms at the expense 
of one of the other dominant firms would not alter the CR4, even though this would likely 
substantially alter market dynamics, competitiveness and concentration. However, the 
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CR4 can tell us the extent to which the largest 4 firms contribute to activity in a particular 
market and is a useful complement to the HHI. High CR4 levels are often linked to the 
presence of an oligopoly.5  
To accurately measure the HHI and CR4 in particular markets the market itself needs to 
be defined. This is done by assessing the substitutability of the products on offer. In 
other words, an assessment is made of the extent to which an alternative product in the 
market would equally satisfy the needs of the consumers in that market.  This is the 
approach used in the Australian Competition and Consumer Act. Having defined the 
market, accurate market share data is also essential for measuring HHI and CR4 given 
that these indices require accurate market share data for their calculation.   
Victorian retail energy markets and market concentration 
In 2002, full retail contestability was introduced in Victoria for all electricity and gas 
customers. This followed an extensive program of privatisation and structural separation 
of the previously state-owned electricity and gas utilities. Victorians could choose 
between different energy retail products offered by different energy retailers. Until 
2009, competition occurred under a regime of retail price regulation. All retail price 
controls were removed in 2009 as market competitiveness was deemed sufficient to 
restrain prices at efficient levels.  
Contestability was initiated with the creation of 5 ’incumbent’ electricity retailers and 3 
‘incumbent’ gas retailers, each of which was assigned customers from defined 
geographic areas. These retailers and others were then allowed to compete for 
customers across Victoria. Through processes of mergers and acquisitions, the 
incumbent retailers were the forerunners of the current ‘big three’ energy retailers that 
now control the vast majority of market share in Victoria’s gas and electricity retail 
markets. These three retailers, Origin, AGL and Energy Australia (formerly TRU) continue 
to hold the lion’s share of the retail market.  
Initial retail contestability led to decreases in retail market concentration as new entrant 
retailers laboured to attract customers from the incumbent retailers. This was highlighted 
by the AEMC in their review of the effectiveness of competition in Victoria’s gas and 
electricity markets. Their analysis of CR4 and HHI showed a steady decline in overall 
Key points 
 Full retail contestability in electricity and gas markets has been in place in 
Victoria since 2002. Full retail price deregulation occurred in 2009. 
 Three retailers, Origin, AGL and Energy Australia, retain very significant 
market shares across both gas and electricity retail markets. 
 It is appropriate to measure market concentration for four distinct markets. 
These are the residential markets for gas and electricity and the business 
market for gas and electricity. 
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market concentration between 2003 and 2006.1 However, CUAC’s analysis shows that 
the level of concentration is now stable or increasing, across both electricity and gas 
retail markets. Interestingly, this has occurred despite the removal of retail price controls, 
which was intended to encourage even greater competition and market dynamism.   
HHI and CR4 in Victorian retail gas and electricity markets  
As mentioned previously, in order to accurately determine the HHI and the CR4 for a 
particular market, the market in question must first be defined. This paper focuses on 
retail electricity and gas markets in Victoria. This provides a good starting point for 
market definition. The products in the Victorian retail electricity market are quite closely 
substitutable, as are the products in the retail gas market. There is, however, an 
important distinction between the markets for households and the markets for 
businesses. Contracts in each of these markets are subject to different regulatory 
conditions and there are some retailers who operate only in the residential market. The 
residential and the business markets should therefore be defined as distinct markets. The 
key reason for this is substitutability. A business cannot replace its current electricity or 
gas product in the business market with a product from the residential market and vice 
versa. Given this, calculations of the HHI and the CR4 are made for the retail electricity 
market for households, the retail electricity market for business and the equivalent gas 
markets.  
The second crucial ingredient for accurate calculation of the HHI and CR4 is market 
share data. While this data is unavailable in the market for many goods and services, 
retail energy is a different story. Average customer numbers for each retailer are 
published annually by the ESC in their Energy Retailer Comparative Performance 
Reports. Using this data, HHI and CR4 can be calculated for each of the four defined 
markets for each year since retail price deregulation, allowing for the identification of 
any trends and issues.  
Trends in HHI and CR4 in Victorian retail energy markets since 
price deregulation  
Key points 
 Market concentration, as measured by HHI and CR4 has been stable or 
increasing since price deregulation in 2009.  
 Particularly high concentration is exhibited in the gas and electricity 
markets for business customers.  
 High levels of market concentration are a “necessary but not sufficient” 
condition for the exercise of market power, so further investigation into the 
competitiveness of Victoria’s retail energy market is warranted. 
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The following table* shows the calculations of HHI and CR4 in Victoria’s four defined 
retail energy markets.  
The table shows that all retail energy markets in Victoria remain highly concentrated. 
The CR4 shows that in all four markets, the largest four firms control over 80 per cent of 
the market. Moreover, the HHI scores for all four markets are at levels that would likely 
arouse interest from the ACCC in the event of further merger and acquisition activity. It 
is telling that there has been no great reduction in market concentration in any of the 
markets analysed since the removal of price controls. In fact, in some markets, such as 
the business electricity market, the trend is the opposite. Concentration in that market 
has increased markedly since price deregulation, with the largest four firms now 
controlling 90 per cent of the market and HHI levels in excess of 2,500.  
In the other three markets, concentration indicators remain fairly stable. However, in 
some of these markets the concentration levels are alarmingly high. The business gas 
market appears to be particularly concentrated, with an HHI approaching 3,000 and 
four firms controlling 95 per cent of the market.   
The high concentration levels in the residential gas market should also be cause for 
some concern and further analysis. While 12 retailers remain active in electricity, there 
are only 7 retailers in the gas market where market concentration remains high across 
both business and residential markets.  
The persistently high levels of concentration in Victoria’s retail energy markets raises 
questions of the effectiveness of competition since price deregulation.  As highlighted by 
the AEMC, high levels of market concentration are a “necessary but not sufficient” 
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* Notes: These calculations were made taking into account ownership and progressive acquisitions. AGL and Powerdirect were treated as 
a single retailer in this study. Despite the fact that two brands are maintained, AGL was the parent company for the period of analysis. 
Two significant mergers happened during the period of analysis.  Country Energy and Energy Australia were purchased by Origin Energy 
and TRU respectively in 2011. For the purposes of this calculation the market share of the purchased provider was added to that of the 
acquirer in the year of acquisition. Only retailers with over 1000 customers are included in the calculation. All data was taken from the 
ESC’s comparative performance reports on pricing for the respective years, which are referenced at end notes 3,6 and 7.    
Residential electricity market 
Year 2009 – 2010 2010 – 2011 2011 – 2012 
HHI 1,904 2,016 1,903 
CR4 80 82 80 
Residential gas market 
Year 2009 – 2010 2010 – 2011 2011 – 2012 
HHI 2,199 2,221 2,149 
CR4 86 86 85 
Business electricity market 
Year 2009 – 2010 2010 – 2011 2011 – 2012 
HHI 2,338 2,495 2,519 
CR4 86 89 90 
Business gas market 
Year 2009 – 2010 2010 – 2011 2011 – 2012 
HHI 2,946 2,946 2,869 
CR4 95 96 95 
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condition for the exercise of market power.1 Given the prima facie concerning levels of 
market concentration, it is appropriate to analyse some of the other features of the retail 
market that may add to our understanding of market competitiveness and dynamism. It 
is also appropriate to identify some areas for further investigation to ensure the market is 
actually delivering against its objectives.  
Why the persistently high levels of concentration in the Victorian 
retail market? 
The analysis of market concentration raises questions as to why new entrant or so-called 
second tier retailers are failing to erode the market dominance of the three major 
retailers. A key dynamic that has resulted in this outcome has been the process of 
acquisition. Origin and TRU (as it then was) managed to preserve their market share 
through, among other strategies, the acquisition of new entrant retailers and their market 
share. 2011 saw two such transactions with Country Energy and Energy Australia, both 
active retailers in Victoria, purchased from the NSW Government by Origin and TRU. 
This resulted in almost 100,000 customers moving across to the major retailer and a 
consolidation in market shares.  
Among the smaller retailers, there have been no remarkable success stories in attracting 
market share. In the residential electricity market, Australian Power and Gas attracted 
approximately 50,000 new customers, while Neighbourhood Energy acquired almost 
40,000 new customers over the three year period. However, these successes seemed to 
occur at the expense of other new entrant retailers and, as the data shows, did not 
fundamentally alter the market’s concentration. It is significant that these successes in the 
residential market were not mirrored in the business electricity market, where both 
Neighbourhood Energy and Australian Power and Gas are not active retailers. This 
may explain why market concentration in the business electricity market has, in fact, 
been increasing.  
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Key points 
 A number of factors could be behind the high market concentration in the 
Victorian retail energy market.   
 Acquisition of smaller retailers by large retailers is one factor but not the 
whole story.  
 There is a possibility that the customer base of the large incumbent 
retailers is more ‘sticky’ or loyal. This can present a barrier to the erosion 
of market share.  
 Barriers to entry in the retail market may be caused by vertical 
integration. The major retailers all have a portfolio of wholesale market 
assets that allows them to manage wholesale market risk internally.   
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The business and residential gas markets are considerably less dynamic than the 
electricity markets, with much smaller movements in market share among new entrant 
retailers. In the residential market, Australian Power and Gas was successful in 
increasing its market share, albeit off a low base. Red Energy also had some success in 
both business and residential markets.  The ability of retailers to easily gain market 
share in gas seems considerably more limited than in electricity.  
Are ‘sticky’ customers the problem?  
One of the interesting features of the Victorian retail energy market is that market 
concentration remains high despite the highest churn rate of any energy market in the 
world. Churn refers to customers moving from their current energy retailer to take up an 
offer with a new retailer. The work of VaasaETT continues to show that 28 per cent of 
Victorian retail energy consumers are churning each year.8 This would appear to 
suggest a high willingness of consumers to take up new offers from different energy 
providers. However, despite this high rate of churn, the three years since price 
deregulation have not seen a significant reduction in market concentration or evidence 
of strong new entrant retailers. This suggests that there are significant barriers to the 
establishment and retention of a customer base for new entrant retailers in particular.  
Given that an analysis of market shares indicates that some second tier/new entrant 
retailers are losing market share to other second tier retailers, it may that the most active 
churn is happening in this market sector. So called ’sticky’ customers who are less likely 
to churn and who exhibit some brand loyalty are much more likely to be customers of 
the ’big three.’ As a result of how the market has evolved, they are much less likely to 
be lured by new entrant retailers. Customers of new entrant retailers, on the other hand, 
will already have switched at least once to a new provider and are much more likely to 
be open to the process.  
The problem of ‘sticky’ customers providing an advantage to incumbent retailers was 
highlighted by Ofgem as an issue in the UK Retail Markets Review. Despite consistently 
high churn rates in that market, the major six retailers retain considerable market 
dominance.9 Our analysis suggests this may also be an issue in the Victorian market. 
Can new entrants compete on price? 
The St Vincent de Paul Society tracks and analyses energy offers in gas and electricity 
retail markets in the national energy market. They have recently released a paper 
detailing the results of this analysis. The St Vincent de Paul Society found that second 
tier retailers were not consistently offering better prices to consumers.10 One would think 
that without offering lower prices it would be difficult for new retailers to attract new 
customers. A recent CUAC survey found that 52 per cent of respondents still found price 
the most important reason for switching energy provider. In the residential retail market 
for electricity, the St Vincent de Paul “data shows that none of the retailers have 
attempted to significantly differentiate themselves in regards to price increases. In 
Melbourne, for example, a typical consumption household experienced an annual 
electricity bill increase of between 9-15% between January and July 2012, if they were 
on a market contract with one of the big three retailers (AGL, Origin or TRU). If 
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households were with one of the second tier retailers the price increase would have 
been between 7-18%. Analysis of the previous price reset in January 2012 paints a 
similar picture.”10 
It seems that there are two possible explanations for this. One is that consumers are not 
able to effectively assess price and are therefore making choices on the basis of other, 
possibly complex or unhelpful, information. This reduces the incentive for second tier 
retailers to offer more competitive prices and, instead, provides an incentive for all 
retailers to attract customers through other channels such as marketing and promotion. 
This is a distinct possibility given that CUAC’s research has shown that many consumers 
find it difficult to compare different offers and often base their choices on unreliable 
information provided at the door, on the telephone and online.2 This suggests that 
marketing expenditure, is a significant factor in the ability to retain market share, rather 
than product differentiation and innovation. This would likely advantage incumbent 
retailers and would suggest that there are concerns about the current level of market 
concentration and possible barriers to the sustainable operation of a new entrant 
retailer.    
Another possible explanation is that second tier retailers simply cannot offer more 
competitive prices than the incumbent retailers. This possibility is also concerning as it 
suggests that there are barriers for new entrant and second tier retailers to acquire 
customers on the basis of the factor that is identified in consumer surveys as the most 
important motivator for switching. If this were the case, the persistent high concentration 
in the retail market should be cause for considerable concern.  
Is vertical integration the issue? 
The inability of second tier retailers to either compete on price or erode the market 
share of the incumbent retailers may be a product of vertical integration creating 
barriers to entry and success for new retailers. The big three retailers are not only active 
in the retail energy market, but also have substantial holdings in wholesale electricity 
and upstream gas markets. According to the Australian Energy Regulator's (AER’s) latest 
State of the Energy Market Report, “Origin Energy, AGL Energy and TRU Energy 
now...control almost 30 per cent of generation capacity in the mainland regions of the 
National Electricity Market. Around 58 per cent of new generation capacity 
commissioned or committed since 2007 is controlled by these entities. Generation 
investment since 2007 by entities that do not also retail energy has been 
negligible...Origin Energy, AGL Energy and TRU Energy also have interests in gas 
production and /or gas storage that complement their interests in gas fired electricity 
generation and energy retailing.”11  
The investment by the big three retailers in electricity generation is largely a result of the 
need for retailers to manage the risk of price volatility in wholesale markets. 
Deregulated wholesale electricity markets often exhibit “high price volatility, strong 
mean-reversion and frequent extreme price spikes...In fact, the Australian electricity 
market is regarded as significantly more volatile and spike-prone than many 
comparable systems.”12 Retailers are exposed to this price risk and most have to 
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manage the risk through participation in hedge markets. This comes with its own risks 
and retailers can seek greater security by internally managing the risk of price volatility 
in the spot market through the ownership of generation assets. Although gas prices are 
not as volatile, there are also advantages to owning upstream gas assets, and this is 
reflected in the decision to invest in such assets by the big three retailers.  
The problem with this vertical integration is that it can “reduce liquidity in wholesale 
markets, posing a potential barrier to entry and expansion for generators and retailers 
that are not vertically integrated.”11  The persistent high concentration over the last few 
years could well be caused by barriers to entry in the retail market caused by increased 
vertical integration between major supply side participants in the wholesale and retail 
markets. This should be further investigated by regulators and Government and careful 
consideration should be given to the appropriateness of a continually expanding 
presence of major retailers in wholesale markets.  
Conclusions and next steps 
The Trade Practices Tribunal (now called the Australian Competition Tribunal) set out the 
factors that it regards as relevant to the analysis of the effectiveness of competition in a 
particular market. These were outlined in the AEMC’s report on the effectiveness of retail 
market competition in Victoria. According to the Tribunal: 
“The elements of market structure which we would stress as needing to be scanned 
in any case are these:  
1) the number and size distribution of independent sellers, especially the 
degree of market concentration; 
 10 
Key points 
 Persistently high market concentration in retail energy markets coupled 
with the other factors highlighted in this research raises questions about 
the effectiveness of retail competition.  
 Government, regulators and others should continue to investigate the 
issue. CUAC will be conducting further research into the Victorian retail 
market to provide additional insight into its competitiveness.  
 Very close regulatory attention should be given to future acquisitions of 
second tier retailers by large incumbents. The impacts on markets for 
business customers should be the subject of particular analysis. 
 Clearer policy direction from Government on the desirability of vertical 
integration in Australia's energy markets would better support the 
evolution of Australia’s energy markets in ways that best serve the long 
term interests of consumers.  
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2) the height of barriers to entry, that is the ease with which new firms may 
enter and secure a viable market; 
3) the extent to which the products of the industry are characterised by 
extreme product differentiation and sales promotion; 
4) the character of ‘vertical relationships’ with customers and with suppliers 
and the extent of vertical integration; and 
5) the nature of any formal stable and fundamental arrangements between 
firms which restrict their ability to function as independent entities. 
Of all these elements of market structure, no doubt the most important is 2), the 
condition of entry. For it is the ease with which firms may enter which establishes 
the possibilities of market concentration over time; and it is the threat of the entry of 
a new firm or a new plant into a market which operates as the ultimate regulator of 
competitive conduct.”1 
This paper has demonstrated that substantial market concentration persists in the energy 
retail market and that vertical integration may both restrict entry into the market by new 
retailers and contain the expansion of existing second tier retailers. Against the criteria 
identified by the Tribunal, this suggests that the effectiveness of competition in the 
Victorian retail market may currently be less than optimal.  
This paper builds on previous work by CUAC and others that highlights factors that may 
be detracting from the quality of retail energy market competition. CUAC research has 
revealed concerns about the effectiveness of consumer participation in energy retail 
markets and the quality of information available to consumers to facilitate their choices. 
If persistently high levels of market concentration were the only noteworthy feature of an 
otherwise highly competitive market, it would hardly warrant a mention. However, taken 
in concert with other factors, such as barriers to entry arising from vertical integration, 
challenges to effective consumer participation and a seemingly more loyal customer 
base among the major retailers, the high market concentration may be indicative of 
broader problems with the effectiveness of retail competition.  
The high levels of concentration in retail gas markets and the retail electricity market for 
business consumers are of particular concern and are certainly worthy of further 
analysis. In gas markets, for both residential and business consumers, there have been 
fewer new entrant retailers challenging the position of incumbents, which lessens the 
chance that incumbent market dominance will be effectively challenged.  
This then leads to consideration of what actions are required by government, regulators 
and others seeking better consumer outcomes in the market for energy. The first 
conclusion is a relatively obvious one that relates to the most common application of 
concentration indices. Given that concentration persists and is often maintained through 
the acquisition of smaller retailers by large incumbents, there should be considerable 
scrutiny of further mergers and acquisitions in the Victorian retail energy market. 
Acquisitions of innovative new entrant/second tier retailers who are successfully gaining 
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market share should be subject to particular regulatory attention. The regulator should 
closely consider the impacts any mergers or acquisitions would have on business and 
residential consumers in both electricity and gas markets, as these are clearly distinct 
markets.  
The second conclusion relates to the structure of Australia’s energy market. Policy 
makers and regulators need to analyse the impact of vertical integration on our energy 
supply system and the impacts that this has on the competitiveness of the retail sector. 
There are arguments that can be made in favour of vertical integration. If internally 
managing risks results in lower costs and lower prices for end users, then it may be a 
desirable market structure. However, if this market structure imposes barriers to entry 
that reduce the effectiveness of competition and enshrine the position of the dominant 
retailers then policy reforms may be required. Clearer policy direction could ensure that 
market structures evolve in ways that best serve the long term interests of consumers.  
A third conclusion relates to the need to continually monitor the effectiveness of retail 
competition and issues that may be hampering consumer benefits from market 
deregulation. CUAC has previously expressed concern that there has been insufficient 
ongoing monitoring of the effectiveness of competition and the experience of consumers 
in the competitive retail market. To that end, CUAC has launched a range of research 
and advocacy initiatives to assess competition and deliver competition-enhancing 
improvements to the retail energy market. CUAC’s other initiatives developed to support 
retail competition are: 
 detailed research on consumer participation in retail energy markets; 
 a set of principles to support the development of a code of practice for online 
price comparison/switching websites; 
 a reform proposal for fixed term retail energy contracts backed by consumer 
research; and 
 comprehensive consumer research on the issue of door-to-door sales.  
CUAC has also flagged its intention to develop a rating scheme that allows retailers to 
be compared on non-price indicators of performance. This research on retail market 
concentration fits with this research and advocacy agenda and suggests issues for 
further consideration regarding the effectiveness of competition in the retail energy 
market. CUAC believes that the issues raised in this paper highlight the ongoing need to 
conduct research into competition effectiveness. Given this, CUAC intends to conduct 
research in early 2013 on the components of retail prices paid by consumers and the 
extent to which rising retail costs are responsible for rising electricity and gas prices in 
Victoria.  
To ensure that this concentration analysis is of ongoing relevance, CUAC will also 
commit to annual updates of the HHI and CR4 figures based on the annual release of 
market share data by the ESC. These updates will include a commentary on the issues 
that have impacted on retail market concentration in the previous year and what this 
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may indicate about competition effectiveness. Such an ongoing analysis of market 
concentration over time can provide much greater insight than one-off measurements 
that fail to account for the dynamic nature of markets.   
However, Government and regulators should also consider this research and how they 
can continue to ensure the effectiveness of competition in Victoria through improved 
monitoring and regulation. To this end, it is appropriate to consider the adequacy of 
existing data collection and its dissemination by energy regulators. Better data could 
assist policy makers, the community and the regulators to assess the health of 
competitive retail markets and target policy and regulatory interventions.  
Above all, it is important that the overarching objective of energy policy and regulation 
should be the long term interests of consumers. If existing markets are not delivering on 
this objective, either as a result of weaknesses in the competitive market or other factors, 
then governments and regulators should respond with appropriate measures to correct 
this. This research aims to provide a contribution to the knowledge base that will allow 
for the effective development of future energy reforms.  
Endnotes 
1.  Australian Energy Market Commission, (2007) Review of the effectiveness of competition in 
electricity and gas retail markets in Victoria, First Final Report, 19 December 2007, Sydney 
2.  Consumer Utilities Advocacy Centre (2011) Improving energy market competition through consumer 
 participation, Melbourne  
3.  Essential Services Commission, Energy retailers comparative performance report – pricing 2011-12, 
 September 2012 
4. Burke, A. Gorg, H. and Hanley, A. (2006) ‘Market Concentration, Market Dynamism and Business 
Survival’, Bettany Centre for Entrepreneurial Performance and Economics, Working Paper Series, 
5. Mahajan, Sanjiv (2006) ‘Concentration ratios for businesses by industry in 2004’, Office of 
National Statistics, Economic Trends 635 
6. Essential Services Commission, Energy retailers comparative performance report – pricing 2010-11, 
December 2011 
7. Essential Services Commission, Energy retailers comparative performance report – pricing 2009-10, 
December 2010 
8. Energy Retailers’ Association of Australia (2012) Media Release: Global report shows Australian 
energy markets are leading the world , 14 June 2012, Sydney 
9.  Ofgem (2011) The Retail Market Review, Findings and initial proposals, United  Kingdom  
10. Dufty, G. and Johnston, M.M. (2012) The NEM—in a bit of a state? Observations from the Vinnies 
Tariff-Tracking Project, Melbourne 
11. Australian Energy Regulator (2011) State of the Energy Market 2011, Canberra 
12. Higgs, H. and Worthington, A. (2008)‘Stochastic price modeling of high volatility, mean-reverting, 
spike-prone commodities: The Australian wholesale spot electricity market,’ Energy Economics, vol. 
30, pp. 3172-3185  
 
 13 
